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THE REALITY OF "A LAST VICTIM" AND
ABUSE OF THE SANCTIONING POWER
George Cochran*
Prior to 1983, Rule 11 (Rule) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure set forth the simple proposition that "[t]he signature of an
attorney ... constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it
is not interposed for delay."' Although it also provided that "a
willful violation" could result in "appropriate disciplinary action,"
sanctions were rarely sought.2  In 1983, however, against a
background of concerns expressed about a caseload crisis,3 alleged
"lawyer incompetence, ' 4 and what was then and remains today the
* Professor of Law, University of Mississippi. As with all my work in this
area, I dedicate this piece to the late Morton Stavis who was instrumental in
putting the Rule 11 Project in place at the Center for Constitutional Rights. In
addition, I want to thank Professor Georgene Vairo, Professor Stephen
Burbank, Professor Jeffrey Stempel, Alan Morrison, David Vladeck, Jerold
Solovy and Laura Kaster for the pro bono services provided to public interest
lawyers targeted by the 1983 version of Rule 11 and the work they performed
individually and collectively to support what ultimately became the 1993
amendment. With respect to the latter, there is also the work of another great
lawyer, the late John Frank, who dedicated a significant portion of his
professional time to develop the "Bench-Bar Amendment" that incorporated
many of the changes now found in the 1993 version. And finally, there is the
work of Chief Judge Mary M. Schroeder and Senior Judge Sam D. Johnson
who, from the appellate level, stood steadfast for the lawyer-sensitive "least
severe sanction adequate to deter" approach now found in the amended Rule.
1. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (1980) (amended 1983). See Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 197 (1983).
2. Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 191
(1988) (noting that from "1950 to 1976 only nineteen Rule 11 motions were
reported.").
3. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism: A
Commentary on the Report of the American Bar Association Commission on
Professionalism, 18 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1149, 1159 (1987).
4. See CHARLEs W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 185-86 n.2
(1986) (detailing Chief Justice Burger's dissatisfaction with the American bar).
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unproven charge that American courts were inundated with frivolous
lawsuits,5 the Rules Committee took an ill-considered, precipitous
step:6  it amended the Rule to provide that the signature of an
attorney certified that a "pleading, motion, or other paper" was not
brought for an improper purpose and reflected a "reasonable inquiry
[that] is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law .... , In contrast to the earlier version, once a violation
was found, the Rule imposed mandatory sanctions which could
"includ[e] a reasonable attorney's fee."
8
After the Rule had been in place for two years, I concluded that
positive benefits were possible if administered by a lawyer-sensitive
5. In 1991, a Federal Judicial Center survey of 546 federal judges
determined that "[a]lthough approximately nine out of ten judges said there is
some degree of groundless litigation... 65% of 546 respondents said the
problem is small or very small, and an additional 22% said it is moderate."
Elizabeth C. Wiggins et al., Special Issue on Rule 11, 2 FJC DIRECTIONs, Nov.
1991, at 28. In this same time frame, and after soliciting the views of over
twelve thousand lawyers and judges and conducting public hearings, a
Committee of the New York State Bar found that there was no data to suggest
that frivolous complaints were a problem confronting that state's courts. See
New York State Bar Ass'n, Report of the Special Committee to Consider
Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation in New York State Courts, 1990 FORDHAM
URB. L.J., 3, 4, 8; see also Thomas B. Edsell, Battle Over Damage Awards
Takes a More Partisan Turn: Trial Lawyers-Key Democratic Donors-Say
They're Targets, WASH. POST, August 10, 2003, at A4 ("The Florida Medical
Association, which had complained 'frivolous' lawsuits are driving up
insurance costs, conceded that frivolous lawsuits are not a problem under
Florida law."); Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights
Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 118 n.524 (2002)
(no empirical support for past and present contentions that "frivolous"
litigation is a concern); Samuel J. Levine, Seeking a Common Language for the
Application of Rule 11 Sanctions: What is "Frivolous"?, 78 NEB. L. REV. 677,
682 (1999) ("[Elven a brief survey of some of the standards articulated by the
courts in a number of circuits reveals broad differences in formulation that
betray both a lack of uniformity among courts and a more general lack of a
clearly defimed standard for frivolous activity.").
6. See George Cochran, Rule 11: The Road to Amendment, 61 MIss. L.J.
5, 7 (1991) (outlining nine issues relating to the amended Rule that were not
anticipated).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment.
8. Id.
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judiciary.9 Soon thereafter, however, it became apparent that the
attractiveness of an award of fees against opposing counsel, coupled
with an increasing propensity for many courts to impose monetary
sanctions for both major and minor violations of the Rule, l° was
producing a torrent of satellite litigation.1
By the end of 1987 there were over 688 Rule 11 decisions
published in the federal reporters, consisting of 496 district court
opinions and 192 circuit court opinions. 12 As a result of the ever-
increasing number of cases targeting those involved in public-interest
litigation, in May of that year I submitted a proposal to the Center
For Constitutional Rights to put in place what was to become known
9. George Cochran, Sanctions Under Rule 11, 1986 Fifth Cir. Rep. 209,
223; see also George Cochran & Georgene Vairo, Rule 11: An Eventful Year,
in CIvIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 343,
360 (Barbara M. Wolvowitz ed., 1988) (expressing desire that Rule would be
"interpreted sensibly").
10. For example, a study by the American Judicature Society found that
monetary sanctions were awarded in approximately 95% of the cases in which
sanctions were imposed. See Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact
of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 943, 956-57 (1992); see also Elizabeth C.
Wiggins et al., supra note 5, at 3, 18 ("Rule I 1 sanctions have typically taken
the form of monetary fees payable to an opposing party."); Sam D. Johnson et
al., The Proposed Amendments to Rule 11: Urgent Problems and Suggested
Solutions, 43 BAYLOR L. REv. 647, 649 (1991) (noting that "some form of
attorneys' fees award is assessed in ninety-six percent of all cases involving a
Rule 11 violation"); Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137
F.R.D. 53, 64 (1991) (noting that the Advisory Committee found that Rule 11
"has too rarely been enforced through nonmonetary sanctions, with
cost-shifting having become the normative sanction").
11. Research conducted by Professor Vairo led to her conclusion that at the
time of the 1993 amendment, there were approximately 7000 reported cases
involving the Rule. Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 589, 599 (1998). Relying on an empirical study by the
Federal Judicial Center, Greg Joseph concludes that when unreported decisions
are included, "actual activity under the Rule dwarfs" the 7000 number.
GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE
14 n.9 (3d ed., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2000) (1989). Also noteworthy is
the fact that in addition to Mr. Joseph's work, the period also witnessed two
additional treatises on the subject. GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11
SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIvES AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES (2d ed.
1992 & Supps. 1993-1995); JEROLD S. SOLOVY, SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 11
(2003).
12. Vairo, supra note 11, at 599.
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as the "Rule 11 Projects.' 3  Designed to provide pro bono
representation for lawyers involved in public interest litigation, the
Project had only one criteria: representation would only be provided
after a determination that the attorney seeking assistance had not
engaged in any professional behavior that would warrant sanctioning
under the "improper purpose" prong of Rule 11.
13. The proposal included the following:
Issues or Propositions Which Have or Can Be Proven:
(a).. I Regardless of the Advisory Committee's intent and the belief
that "satellite litigation" was to be avoided, Rule 11 now plays a
significant role in federal litigation.
(b) At this point, the plaintiff's bar in general and the civil rights bar in
particular is the primary victim of the Rule's penalties.
(c) The financial enticement of the Rule, i.e., fee shifting, has put in
place a litigation philosophy that generates Rule 11 motions whenever
the opportunity presents itself.
(d) Rule 11 motions supercharge a case, poison the atmosphere,
increase litigation costs and endanger the attorney-client relationship.
(e) There is no correlation between the imposition of sanctions in the
form of fee shifting and legitimate objectives such as speedier trials
and upgrading professional behavior of attorneys practicing in federal
court.
(f) Marginal cases (which in the past have been precedent setting) are
not being filed.
(h) As discovered by a research project conducted by the Federal
Judicial Center, when faced with an identical set of facts, judges are in
disagreement as to whether or not a Rule 11 violation has occurred.
(i) Although one goal sought to be attained through the increased use
of sanctions is to ameliorate the "case load crisis" the result has been
an increase in satellite litigation and cases being channeled onto the
appellate docket which heretofore would not have been appealed.
Specifically, anyone who follows F.2d understands that cases
involving decisions to impose or deny sanctions by district courts are
now forming a recognizable segment of the appellate docket.
(k) In most instances, "attorney misconduct" is a difference of opinion
between counsel and a federal judge as to whether a case is warranted
by existing law or extension modification or reversal thereof, not
willful, knowing, intentional or vexatious behavior by counsel.
Memorandum from George Cochran, to Morton Stavis on Sanctions Project
(May 20, 1987) (on file with author).
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What followed was a five-year period of- intensive, often
emotional' 4 litigation that produced little professional satisfaction.'
5
The objective of this presentation, however, is not to reconfirm the
proposition that the action taken in 1993 to amend the Rule was
correct' 6 by detailing the experiences of those represented by the
Project. Rather, I will focus on one case that highlights the
unexpected, tragic consequences of the 1983 amendment. Since the
subject is the alleged abuse of power by federal judges, it is
necessary to place the event in a historical context. To this end, I
invite the reader to revisit the impeachment proceedings of United
States District Court Judge Robert Peck.
I. THE PECK IMPEACHMENT
Following the Louisiana Purchase, retiring French and Spanish
officials were "not above feathering their nests."' 7 To this end, they
back-dated grants to enormous tracts of land in the state of Missouri.
The fate of these grants soon became "a foremost question of life,
14. "Emotional" in the context of representing lawyers who firmly believed
their lawsuit was well grounded in fact or law, and who had both their
professional reputation and bank account on the line because of opposing
counsel's decision to file a Rule 11 motion.
15. There were, however, some exceptions. See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital
Sec. Servs., Inc., 812 F.2d 984, 989 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in
part and remanded, 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988) (altering a "no free
passes" rule to mandating a "least severe sanction" approach); Blue v. United
States Dept. of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990) (reversing a $12,000
sanction against junior associate), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 959 (1991).
16. As Linda Mullenix explains:
We are often alerted to a problematic rulemaking by the hue and
cry of the practicing bar. Perhaps the most famous example of this
was the 1983 amendment to Rule 11, the federal sanctioning
provision, which was intended "to put teeth" into the sanctioning rule.
It certainly did. In the ensuing decade, the federal courts were
inundated with Rule 11 petitions and sanctions. The outrage of the
practicing bar to the amended Rule 11 finally led to further
amendment of Rule 11 in 1993, thereby providing a "safe harbor" for
alleged attorney improprieties. The 1993 amendments did the trick. I
am very willing to suggest that the 1993 Rule 11 amendments are a
fine example of a good rulemaking.
Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in Whoville: Rule 23(), A Good Rulemaking, 69
TENN. L. REV. 97, 100 n.17 (2001) (citation omitted).
17. Walter Nelles & Carol Weiss King, Contempt by Publication in the
United States, 28 CoLUM. L. REv. 401, 424 (1928).
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law, business and politics"' 8 in the state. One group aligned with
speculative interests in unconfirmed titles was headed by a United
States Senator, Thomas Hart Benton. Following his election, "the
person who in fact succeeded him as leader of the legal forces
interested (contingent fees were the rule)... was Benton's intimate
crony, an Irish adventurer named Luke Lawless."'19
In 1826, Lawless brought a test case captioned Heirs of Antoine
Soulard. When filed, it was described by Missouri's other Senator as
"a subject of sheer speculation by a few lawyers, including a corrupt
Senator [Benton] and a common swindler [Lawless]. 2° The claim
21was for a tract of ten thousand acres. It was tried in Judge Peck's
court whose appointment had been secured by the political enemies
of Benton and Lawless.22
Judge Peck's decision against the Soulard claimants had a
devastating impact on Lawless' clients' interests in that case. What
concerned Lawless even more was the fact that Judge Peck's "view,
if persisted in, was fatal to substantially the whole mass of
unconfirmed claims" in seventy-two of which Lawless was
counsel.23
Eight days after final judgment was entered by Judge Peck, there
appeared in a St. Louis newspaper a letter anonymously authored by
Lawless but signed by "A Citizen." As described in the letter, its
purpose was "to counteract the effect that Judge Peck's opinion was
calculated to produce on the value of the unconfirmed French and
Spanish land titles" and was held out to present a "'concise statement
of some of the principal errors into which... Judge Peck had
fallen. 24 As evaluated by historians studying the event:,
[The letter] could have no end except to subject the court
to contumely and promote sympathy with the land
claimants, making fair juries unobtainable in their cases;
and that it would tax even judicial fortitude to withstand the
"loose and interested public opinion" to which it appealed.
18. Id. at 425.
19. Id. at 425-26.
20. Id. at 426.
21. Id. at 427.
22. Id. at 426.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 428.
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[Further,]... the publication could not fail to stimulate
extra-mural pressure upon the administration of justice in
the remaining cases-a pressure, moreover, distinctly likely
in that pioneer society to take the form of lawless
violence.25
Judge Peck proceeded by writ of attachment against Lawless. After
four days of heated argument, Lawless was found guilty of contempt
and sentenced to one day's imprisonment and suspension from
practice for eighteen months.
Lawless turned to Congress and filed a petition with the House
of Representatives for the impeachment of Judge Peck. In his
statement to that body, he explained:
That your petitioner, [in writing the letter], not only
availed himself of what he believed to be his right as a
private citizen, but acted from a sense of duty to those
numerous land claimants by whom [he] was employed as
counsel.
That the object of your petitioner was, if possible, to
counteract the effect that Judge Peck's opinion was
calculated to produce on the value of unconfirmed [land
titles.]
26
In response, Judge Peck drafted a "memorial" to the House.
This document condemned Lawless' representations relating to
freedom of the press and "the liberty of the American citizen," as
"trite topics continually resorted to... in vain, in Great
Britain .... ,27 In a subsequent letter, Peck also commented that his
decision might have been different if "the subject-matter had not still
[been] in the same tribunal, though in different names...."28
Continuing:
It was the string of legal absurdities imputed to the court,
calculated to excite the contempt and indignation of the
public at large against the tribunal; to prejudice the public
mind with regard to the claims of the same character yet
remaining for decision before the same court; to impair the
25. Id. at 428, 526.
26. ARTHUR J. STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK 2
(1833).
27. Id. at 10.
28. Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
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confidence of the suitors in the purity and intelligence of
the tribunal before which the claims were depending; to
awaken their resentment against the Judge... and thus to
restrain the court in the free, and fearless, and independent
exercise of its judgment in the remaining cases... and this
more especially, when the contempt is considered as having
been committed by an officer of the court, pursuing his
practice therein under its protection, and bound, therefore,
to treat it and its decisions with respect.
29
Judge Peck's defense to issuance of Articles of Impeachment by
the House continued by pointing out that Lawless had admitted, that
his purpose in publishing the letter was "to produce an effect, not on
Soulard's claim, but on other claims in which he was counsel, and
which were still depending [sic] before the Court."3  Whatever
"right" there was to publish, therefore, must take into account
Lawless' purpose of "poisoning the public mind with regard to
causes... before they are heard" and the court's common-law
responsibility to "keep the streams of justice clear and pure." 31 The
House responded by voting 123 to 49 to issue the Articles of
Impeachment.32
Before the Senate, Congressman McDuffie (a manager
designated by the House) initiated the debate by pointing out that
"necessity, to be sure is the tyrant's plea... and that our judges and
lawyers have [through reliance on English common law] become
imbued with principles which are utterly incompatible with every
just concept.., of liberty.
' 33
A major portion of House Manager (later President) James
Buchanan's argument focused on the First Amendment and the
proposition that all segments of the federal government (including
the judiciary) were bound by its restrictions.34  Asking for a
29. Id.
30. Id. at 19.
31. Id. at39.
32. Id. at 36.
33. Id. at 87.
34. Turning his attention to repudiation of the Sedition Act of 1798,
Buchanan stated:
It is now, I believe, freely admitted by every person... that
Congress, in passing this Act, had transcended their powers .... [I]f
any principle has been established beyond a doubt by the almost
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conviction "in the name of the people of the United States, whose
constitution and laws [Peck] has violated by tyranny and
oppression, 35 he concluded:
I will venture to predict, that whatever may be the decision
of the Senate upon this impeachment, Judge Peck has been
the last man in the United States to exercise this power, and
Mr. Lawless has been its last victim.
36
Judge Peck escaped impeachment by one vote. Within twenty-
four hours of acquittal, the House instructed its Judiciary Committee
"to inquire into the expediency of defining by statute all offenses
which may be punished as contempts of the courts of the United
States. 37 Without debate, the two houses enacted what is now the
modem contempt statute. It provides, among other things, that the
contempt power shall not extend to any cases except the
"[m]isbehavior of any person in [the] presence [of the court] or so
near thereto as to obstruct the administration ofjustice ... ,38
In 1928, Walter Nelles and Carol King published the seminal
work on contempt by publication. 39 In contrast to Buchanan's "last
victim" pronouncement during the Peck debates, the authors
uncovered a large number of state and federal cases employing the
unanimous opinion of the people of the United States, it is that the
sedition law was unconstitutional ....
Shall then a petty judge[,] although Congress itself dare not pass a
law for the punishment of libellers against its own members, or the
President of the United States be permitted to sit as the sole judge in
his own cause, and in palpable violation of the constitution, fine and
imprison at his own pleasure the author of a libel against
him?... Shall [the] courts of justice exercise a power as a bare
incident, vastly beyond what their creators could confer upon them?
You might as well attempt to stop the flowing tide, lest it might
overwhelm the temporary hut of the fisherman upon the shore, as to
arrest the march of public opinion in this country, because in its course
it might incidentally affect the merits of a cause depending between
individuals.
Id. at 447-48.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 430.
37. GALES & SEATON'S REGISTER OF DEBATES, 21st Cong., 2d Sess., col.
560 (1831).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1971).
39. Nelles & King, supra note 17.
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pre-Peck, common law analysis to contempts by publication.
40
Finding the decisions utterly lacking in analysis, the authors focused
on what they perceived as the mind set of the judges involved:
That the personal feelings of judges were not dormant in
these cases there is much evidence: in protestations of
impersonality and self-righteousness which true judicial
serenity would find superfluous; in exuberances of
indignation and pathos; in the extraordinary length of many
opinions; in monumental but uncritical citation authorities;
in strained construction of statutory and constitutional
provisions and powers;.., and in the significant non-
occurrence of cases of punishment for publications
concerning pending litigation which are friendly to the
position finally adopted by the court.4'
II. THE PECK IMPEACHMENT AND PROFESSOR BARRY NAKELL
In the fall of 1985, the Fordham Law School hosted a
symposium on the 1983 amendment to Rule 11. During the
proceedings one participant commented that judges "can be very
arbitrary... and a lot of them have deep-seated biases and are out to
get particular lawyers. And boy, Rule 11 is some tool to do it
with. '' 2 His point is obvious: as proved the case with Judge Peck's
open-ended justification to "keep the streams of justice clear and
pure, '' 3 the objective envisioned by the Advisory Committee to
"streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or
defenses ' 44 could and would be the subject of abuse by a certain
segment of the federal judiciary.45 I submit that of the thousands of
40. Id. at 533-43.
41. Id. at 545-47.
42. Melvyn I. Weiss, A Practitioner's Commentary on the Actual Use of
Amended Rule 11, 54 FoRDHAM L. REV. 23, 26 (1985).
43. STANSBURY, supra note 26, at 36.
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
45. "During the past three decades, utilization of litigation, pleadings, and
procedure has become more and more contentious. Claims of filing frivolous
suits and threats of sanctions have permeated the courtrooms to the extent that
the legal arena resembles guerilla warfare between Rambo attorneys
representing Rambo clients before Rambo judges." Thomas E. Richard,
Professionalism: What Rules Do We Play By?, 30 S.U. L. REV. 15, 26 (2002).
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cases litigated under the 1983 Rule,46 none exemplify that abuse
more than what was experienced by Professor Barry Nakell.47 Once
understood, I also submit that if James Buchanan were alive today,
he would conclude that the "last man" pronouncement made with
respect to Luke Lawless is equally applicable to Professor Nakell.
Barry Nakell was a tenured law professor at the University of
North Carolina. Having served on the faculty for almost twenty
years, by 1988 he was one of the most "admired and successful
individuals" in the Chapel Hill community.48 A recipient of the
Frank Porter Graham Award as an individual who had given
outstanding service to the preservation and advancement of civil
liberties in North Carolina, he was also co-author of a major book on
the death penalty49 and counsel of record in the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Bounds v. Smith.50 His impact on those around
him was described by an ex-student as follows:
No attorney in this state... has demonstrated a more
sincere commitment to the cause of treating prisoners with
basic dignity and humaneness than Barry Nakell.... In all
of my dealings with Barry Nakell, he has exhibited
unquestioned personal integrity and adherence to high
ideals of professionalism. He has been a source of
inspiration to me, both personally and professionally.
5 1
46. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
47. Major commentary and critical analysis of Rule 11 has, and continues
to be provided by Professor Carl Tobias. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, The 1993
Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171 (1994); Carl Tobias,
Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 429 (1992);
Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77
IOWA L. REv. 1775 (1992); Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 855 (1992). Included in his publications is an exhaustive, in-depth
exploration of Professor Nakell's case. Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum,
26 GA. L. REV. 901 (1992) [hereinafter Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum]).
48. Memorandum of Professor Barry Nakell Regarding Nature of
Sanctions, Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt, No. 89-06CIV-3-H (E.D.N.C.
Aug. 5, 1991) [hereinafter Sasser & Geer Memorandum]. This document, as
well as a subsequent brief filed with the Fourth Circuit, see note 87, infra, were
authored by Mr. Jonathan Sasser & Ms. (now Judge) Martha Geer, attorneys
practicing in Raleigh.
49. BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE
DEATH PENALTY (1986).
50. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
51. Sasser & Geer Memorandum, supra note 48, at 5.
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And, as described by his Dean, "Professor Nakell has sincerely
presented himself to his colleagues and students as a deeply
committed civil rights lawyer, who has not been afraid to take on
difficult and controversial cases, but who has done so within the best
ethical traditions of our profession. 5 2
After taking his position on the faculty, Professor Nakell became
involved with the Lumbee Indian community5 3 in Robeson County, a
poor, rural area located in eastern North Carolina. With a population
distribution of approximately one-third African American, one-third
white, and one-third Lumbee,5 4 the County has historically been both
a center for acts of racism as well as all other problems endemic to
poverty-stricken areas.5 5  As time went on, Professor Nakell's
personal and professional life became so intertwined with the
Lumbee community that the editor of their local newspaper, The
North Carolina Indian Voice, named his daughter, Brandi Nakell
Barton, in his honor.
56
The year 1988 was a tumultuous period in Robeson County. In
order to bring to the public's attention what they contended to be
widespread corruption, two members of the Lumbee tribe, Eddie
Hatcher and Timothy Jacobs, staged an armed take-over of an office
building and held twenty hostages for ten hours.57 Following
negotiations that included a promise that a Governor's Task Force
would investigate the charges made, the event ended peacefully with
a surrender to federal authorities.58
52. Id. at 5-6.
53. The plight of this discrete segment of the American Indian population
was recently described as follows:
Lumbee Indians make up more than half of the 19,000 Indian students
in North Carolina's school system. Most of them live in Robeson
County, where 261 of the 545 dropouts in 2002 were Lumbees,
according to the report. The county had a dropout rate of 7.23 percent,
the highest in North Carolina.
SUN-NEWS, June 3, 2003.
54. Tracing the County's history, one community leader explained: "We
had three-way segregation in Robeson then-white, black and Indian. There
were three entrances to the movie theater, three water fountains, and six
bathrooms." Stan Swofford, Revels Was Leader in Fight Against Racism,
NEWS & RECORD, July 12, 2003, at Al.
55. See Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, supra note 47, at 901.
56. Sasser & Geer Memorandum, supra note 48, at 6.
57. Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, supra note 47, at 902.
58. Id. at 902-03.
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Subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted Hatcher and Jacobs
on weapons charges. 59  In these proceedings, the former was
represented by the well-known civil rights lawyer William Kunstler
and Professor Nakell, the latter by Lewis Pitts, director of a local
public interest law finn.60 Following a three-week trial, the jury
entered a verdict of not guilty.6' Commenting on the impact of the
jury's decision, the Charlotte Observer editorialized:
Obviously the allegations that Mr. Hatcher and Mr. Jacobs
made about conditions in their county were not only
credible, but persuasive enough to convince the jury that
they acted without criminal intent. ... And jurors reached
that conclusion without some of the most damaging
testimony about the criminal justice system [by] Maurice
Geiger, a lawyer and co-director of the Rural Justice
Center.... He said there were pervasive local assertions
that law enforcement officers are involved in drug
dealing.... There are simply too many rumors and
assertions of corruption and injustice there for state and
federal officials to ignore.62
Immediately following dismissal of the criminal proceedings,
Hatcher began an intensive campaign in Robeson County to expose
corruption, and also conducted a petition drive to remove the Sheriff
and his Deputy from office.63 In response to what was perceived to
be intimidating acts by members of the State Bureau of Investigation
and the Sheriffs Department, Hatcher and other members of the
Lumbee community sought assistance from Professor Nakell and
Pitts.64 Professor Nakell concluded that the situation warranted an
investigation by the Attorney General's Office and wrote seeking
assistance. The request was rejected.65
At this point, additional legal concerns were raised by two
separate events. Criminal proceedings for kidnapping were brought
59. Id. at 909.
60. Id. at 909-10.
61. Id.
62. Verdict Indicts Robeson-Shocking Decision Challenges Gov. Martin,
Other Officials, CHARLOIE OBSERVER, Oct. 17, 1988, at A17.
63. Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, supra note 47, at 910-11.
64. Id. at911.
65. Id. at 911-12.
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against Hatcher and Jacobs in state court, an action considered to be
in violation of an agreement implicit in negotiations leading up to
their surrender to federal authorities.66 In addition, while Jacobs was
in New York fighting extradition, he received information that
attempts were being made through his parents to have Pitts dismissed
as his lawyer.
67
The cumulative impact of all these events triggered extensive
research by both Professor Nakell and Pitts that resulted in the
drafting of a thirty-five page omnibus complaint on behalf of Jacobs,
Hatcher, and six other Lumbee Indians.68 It alleged that state and
local officials were engaged in intentional behavior designed to
infringe First and Sixth Amendment rights, and sought an injunction
against the then pending criminal prosecution. After circulating the
draft to numerous lawyers including an attorney experienced in civil
69rights litigation, the complaint was filed in the court of United
States District Judge Malcom Howard. Subsequently, it was
amended to add William Kunstler as counsel.
Soon after the filing of the amended complaint, the harassment
stopped.7 ° Coupling this fact with a decision by Jacobs to enter into
a plea agreement and counsels' reassessment of defenses available to
Hatcher in his trial, the decision was made to dismiss the case.71 To
effectuate the latter, Professor Nakell telephoned opposing counsel in
the Attorney General's Office and reached an agreement 72 that there
was no objection for him to proceed with a voluntary dismissal under
Rule 41(a)(2).73 The filing was made and Judge Howard proceeded
to enter a final order. Six weeks later, the Attorney General's Office,
66. Id. at 912.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 913-14.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 914-15; see also WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER, MY LIFE AS A
RADICAL LAWYER 390 (1994) (discussing how harassment stopped after filing
complaint).
71. Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, supra note 47, at 915.
72. Id.
73. "Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the
court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper." FED. R.
CIV. P. 41(a)(2).
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without previous notice of any kind, filed a fifty-one page Rule 11
motion and brief in support.
74
Following extensive submissions by all parties, Judge Howard
heard oral arguments on the motion.75 Thereafter, on September 27,
1989, he requested that defense counsel submit affidavits specifying
their fees and expenses and, without affording an opportunity to
respond, issued his decision the following day.76 In his opinion,
Judge Howard held that the filing of the belated Rule 11 motion was
procedurally proper.77 Thereafter, and in the context of scathing
denunciations of the complaint and the legal basis for its filing,78 he
determined that there were violations of both the reasonable inquiry
into fact and law requirements of Rule 11 and the proscription
against filings made for an improper purpose.79
Turning to the issue of what he perceived to be a proper sanction
serving the deterrent objective of Rule 11, Judge Howard prefaced
his conclusion with the approach so eloquently described by Walter
Nelles and Carol King seventy-five years ago. 0 Pointing out that
since civil rights "attorneys have played an invaluable role in
instigating and promoting numerous societal goals," he insures the
reader that his decision required "great reflection."8' Certain that his
order "in no way [would] deter civil rights lawyers from filing
legitimate complaints in the future to protect the civil rights of others
and the Constitution that we all hold so dear," he then proceeded to
impose joint and several liability on all counsel in an amount equal to
74. Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, supra note 47, at 916.
75. By this time, the filings in the case reached a proportion suitable to an
antitrust case: "On the Rule 11 motion alone, the defendants have written 97
pages of memoranda, the plaintiffs 90. Each side has submitted several
hundred pages of appendices. The previous filings in the case are of similar
length." Robeson Def. Comm. v. Britt, 132 F.R.D. 650, 652 n.1 (E.D.N.C.
1989).
76. Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, supra note 47, at 915.
77. Robeson, 132 F.R.D. at 653.
78. See id. at 656 (claim made not worthy of a "[f]irst year law student[]");
id. at 658 ("not impressed" by voluminous affidavits filed in support of factual
allegations contained in complaint); id. at 659 (complaint reflected "minimal
research and investigation").
79. Id. at 653-60. For a detailed analysis of the opinion see Tobias, Civil
Rights Conundrum, supra note 47, at 916-20.
80. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
81. Robeson, 132 F.R.D. at 659.
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all fees requested: $92,834.28.82 Concerned that the amount
imposed was insufficient and (as was Judge Peck) incensed with
publicity surrounding the filing of the case, he assessed additional
"punitive sanctions" in the amount of $10,000 against each
attorney.8 3
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit,84 that segment of Judge
Howard's decision with respect to substantive Rule 11 violations was
affirmed . However, the court remanded for reconsideration of the
award of fees pursuant to the "least severe sanction" standard86 and
reversed the $10,000 order penalty.8 7 Subsequently, Judge Howard
reduced the sanction to $50,00088 which was, in turn, affirmed by the
Fourth Circuit.
8 9
82. Id.
83. Id. at 660.
84. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 969
(1991). On the same day that the court handed down its decision in Professor
Nakell's case, it also affirmed sanctions against counsel in another case
coming from the Eastern District of North Carolina. Blue v. United States
Dept. of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990). Blue was an appeal of a case
involving alleged Title VII violations by the United States Army at Fort Bragg
in which Judge James Fox imposed a total of $85,000 in sanctions. Id. at 530-
32. A large portion of this amount ($30,000) was awarded against Julius
Chambers, who graduated first in his class at the University of North Carolina,
served as Editor-in-Chief of the Law Review, went on to establish and become
senior partner in the premier civil rights firm in North Carolina and, at the time
that he was sanctioned, was serving as Director of the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund. Id. at 530. With slight modification, the court affirmed the sanctions
against Mr. Chambers. Id. at 550-51.
85. With an approach as callous as that employed by Judge Howard. See
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 516 (claims in complaint reflected either "incompetency
or wilful misconduct"); id. at 517 (fact that complaint was reviewed by
independent attorney experienced in the field irrelevant because he "may" have
been unfamiliar with facts and law); id. at 519 (dismissal indicates that there
was never an intent to litigate the case and supports conclusion that complaint
"wilfully included the baseless claims"). Although there had never been an
evidentiary hearing of any type, the court also concluded that Judge Howard's
refusal to hold a hearing on the conflicting issues of fact raised in affidavits
and exhibits was correct because his "participation in the proceedings" gave
him "full knowledge" of all "relevant facts." Id. at 522.
86. Id. at 523-24.
87. Id. at 525. For a critical analysis of the opinion, see Tobias, Civil
Rights Conundrum, supra note 47, at 924-43.
88. In re Pitts, No. 91-2265, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265, at *2 (4th Cir.
July 2, 1992); see Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, supra note 47, at 945-49
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While the sanctions issue was being litigated, Professor Nakell's
life spun out of control. Unlike an attorney in private practice, his
position as a law professor placed him in an especially vulnerable
position with respect to the consequences of the court's action. As
described by his Dean:
The punitive effect of Rule 11 sanctions on any law teacher
may be enormous.... The fact that a court has found the
teacher guilty of improper conduct as a lawyer calls into
question the teacher's integrity and credibility.... The long
range effect of such sanctions on a law teacher's career may
be disastrous. Decisions with regard to salary,
administrative assignments, and job mobility may all be
affected.... Most significantly, the law teacher's
relationship with his or her colleagues and students may be
adversely affected for the remainder of the teacher's
career.
90
Furthermore, "the court's action, coupled with the language of the
court's written opinion... has had a devastating effect on Professor
Nakell.... [T]he emotional impact upon him has been catastrophic.
He has become extraordinarily focused on this case and its impact
upon him and his reputation."
91
Professor Nakell's rabbi also observed the effect of the
sanctions: "[The case] was a source of great distress to Barry and his
family. Worse was the public implication that he, a lawyer known
for ethics and altruism, had been convicted of being capricious and
unethical. This shook Barry...."92
(setting forth what was contended to be numerous errors in Judge Howard's
interpretation of "the least severe sanction" test).
89. Pitts, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265, at *6; cf Tobias, Civil Rights
Conundrum, supra note 47, at 949-51 (detailing unpublished opinion by court
which found no abuse of discretion).
90. Brief of Appellant Barry Nakell at 11-12, In re Barry Nakell, No. 91-
2266 (4th Cir. 1991).
91. Sasser & Geer Memorandum, supra note 48, at 4 (citation omitted).
For those who question the thin ice on which law professors often skate,
compare the language employed by Judge Howard and the Court of Appeals in
their opinions, supra notes 78, 85, with the scenario of first-year law students
being directed by their knowledgeable classmates to case citations. See
Robeson Def. Comm. v. Britt, 132 F.R.D. 650 (E.D.N.C. 1989) and Kunstler,
914 F.2d 505.
92. Sasser & Geer Memorandum, supra note 48, at 4-5.
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Professor Nakell's rabbi continued:
For Barry Nakell to be subjected to such negative public
attention for these many months was a devastating
punishment for him.... Not only did Professor Nakell's
activity as a respected leader of the Jewish community
diminish because of his embarrassment and the drain on his
energies (he no longer attended Jewish Federation meetings
or initiated programs in the Jewish Vegetarian Society
which was so important to him), but he even stopped
attending the Saturday morning Bible study group at which
he was a regular.
93
The enormous psychological distress had its consequences.
After becoming enraged while working on legal papers bearing on
his case, Professor Nakell walked out of a store with a book. He was
charged with and plead guilty to shoplifting. His "sense of integrity
led him to plead guilty.... He felt guilty and could not, he felt, say
otherwise., 94 Disciplinary proceedings initiated by the State Bar95
resulted in a one-year suspension of his license, 96 and, over the
objection of a faculty committee, he later lost his teaching position.
97
III. PROFESSOR NAKELL AND THE AMENDED RULE
Professor Linda Mullenix hits the nail on the head when she
points out that the 1993 amendment is "a fine example of good
rulemaking.' ' 98  One major objective, to "reduce the number of
motions for sanctions,"99 has clearly been met.' 1 Equally beneficial,
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id. at 6. See also id. at 7 (conclusion by his Dean that conviction
stemmed "from the crushing effect of the court's imposition of sanctions and
accompanying opinion").
95. Id. at 17.
96. See Todd Nelson, Law Professor Suspended After Second Shoplifting
Charge, THE NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct. 3, 1996, at A3 (newspaper article
detailing events, including a second, minor shoplifting incident occurring after
imposition of sanctions).
97. See Nakell's Bid for Appeal Denied by UNC Board, NEWS &
OBSERVER, June 14, 1997, at B3 (newspaper article reporting the fact that the
Board of Governors of the University upheld the decision to terminate).
98. See Mullenix, supra note 16, at 100 n.17.
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
100. One of the leading proponents of the 1983 version of Rule 11, Judge
Milton Shadur of the Northern District of Illinois, has taken the position that
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however, is the fact that the key provision responsible for the
dramatic decrease in Rule 11 activity also insures that Professor
Nakell will have been the "last" attorney targeted by a Rule 11
motion after the entry of a final judgment.
The critical component of the new Rule 11 is referred to as the
"safe-harbor" provision. Pursuant to its requirements, unless
previously served on opposing counsel and no corrective action is
taken within twenty-one days, a motion for sanctions cannot be filed
with the court.10 1 Intended "to give the parties at whom the motion is
directed an opportunity to withdraw or correct the offending
contention,"' 2 the Notes admonish that "a party cannot delay serving
"Rule 11 is pretty much dead." Laura Duncan, Sanctions Litigation Declining:
Decrease Attributed to 1-Year-Old Safe Harbor-Amendments to Rule 11,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1995, at 12. Professor Vairo concludes that "the volume of
Rule 11 activity is greatly diminished. Some judges report that nobody is
making Rule 11 motions any more .... My experience confirms these
anecdotal reports. When the rule was in its heyday, I would rip handfuls of
Rule 11 cases out of each.., advance sheet reporter." Georgene M. Vairo,
Rule 11 Update, in CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE
COURTS 277, 279 (1997). See also Laura Duncan, supra, at 12 (concluding
that what was a flood is now a "trickle." "Initial results show a marked decline
in reported cases under the new Rule 11, a trend confirmed by interviews with
federal judges, lawyers and law professors."); Theodore C. Hirt, A Second
Look at Amended Rule 11, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 1007, 1026 (1999) ("To date,
there is relatively little academic or practitioner commentary on how the
amended Rule operates. There is, however, some 'anecdotal' reporting, with
some commentators stating that there are fewer sanctions motions filed under
the amended Rule."); Sidney B. Hewlett, New Frivolous Litigation Law in
Texas: The Latest Development in the Continuing Saga, 48 BAYLOR L. REV.
421, 438 (1996) (a "little more than a year since the federal rule governing
sanctions was revised to stem the flood of litigation over frivolous lawsuits, the
deluge appears to have slowed to a trickle."). But see Danielle Kie Hart, Still
Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
And Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments,
37 VAL. U. L. REv. 1 (2002) (discussing issues of concern under the new
Rule).
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A) (The motion "describ[ing] the specific
conduct alleged to violate" the Rule is served in person or by mail on counsel
in accordance with Rule 5).
102. AeroTech, Inc. v. Estes, 110 F.3d 1523, 1528-29 (10th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1995)); see also Ridder v.
City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 294-95, 297 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing the
history of the "safe harbor" provision and holding ineffective a Rule 11 motion
filed after summary judgment); Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir.
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its Rule 11 motion [as was done in Professor Nakell's case] until
conclusion of the case... ,,103
In a fascinating article, Professor Charles Yablon argues that
many civil rights attorneys decide to file cases involving claims that
have "a low (but not zero) probability of success."' 0 Such claims,
he argues, are not frivolous because frivolous claims, "[u]nder the
standard view.., are baseless claims that no reasonable lawyer
would ever have brought."' 05  By definition, therefore, because a
long-shot has some, though minimal, probability of success, such
claims are not frivolous. 0 6 This analysis is directly applicable to
Professor Nakell's case. 10 7  It is also encompassed by another
segment of the 1993 amendments designed as a shield for lawyers
filing suits who base their claims for relief on not yet clearly defined
rights. 108
The amended Rule 11 provides that lawyers may make
arguments they believe to be "warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law .... ,109 Adding
substance to the provision, the Advisory Committee's Note points
out that the Rule is now intended to insure that courts are sensitive to
the category of cases described by Professor Yablon. As explained:
[The Rule] establishes an objective standard, intended to
eliminate any "empty-head pure-heart" justification for
patently frivolous arguments. However, the extent to which
a litigant has researched the issues and found some support
for its theories even in minority opinions, in law review
1998) (reversing Rule 11 sanction imposed on motion filed after dismissal of
sanctionable pleading).
103. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
104. Charles M. Yablon, The Good, The Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An
Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REv. 65, 67 (1996).
105. Id. at 81.
106. Id.
107. For a thorough review of the merits of claims found in Professor
Nakell's complaint, see Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, supra note 47.
108. As such, it also provides the necessary breathing space for continued
developments in the field of constitutional and federal statutory law. Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 n.33 (1980) ("deleterious effect of
freezing constitutional law" is a significant policy consideration in denying
qualified immunity law defense to political subdivisions).
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(2).
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articles, or through consultation with other attorneys should
certainly be taken into account in determining whether [the
Rule] has been violated. Although arguments for a change
of law are not required to be specifically so identified, a
contention that is so identified should be viewed with
greater tolerance under the [R]ule.
l l0
The Rule also alters the test for liability when factual allegations
are in dispute. The signature of an attorney now certifies that "to the
best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances... the allegations and
other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically
so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.... 111
Factual allegations in Professor Nakell's Robeson County
complaint were (1) formed after over twenty years of professional
and personal experiences in the County; (2) at issue and sufficiently
proven to the federal jury that entered the not guilty verdict on the
kidnapping charge; (3) verifiable by Jacob's parents (Sixth
Amendment violations); or (4) verifiable by the six named Lumbee
Indian plaintiffs (First Amendment violations). As such, they fit
precisely the mold contemplated by the new Rule:
The certification with respect to allegations and other
factual contentions is revised in recognition that sometimes
a litigant may have good reason to believe that a fact is true
or false but may need discovery, formal or informal, from
opposing parties or third persons to gather and confirm the
evidentiary basis for the allegation.'
12
Finally, the new Rule places "greater constraints [on judges] ...
in dealing with infractions 13 In contrast to the 1983 version,
with its not so subtle open-ended invitation for courts to shift fees
once a violation was found,1 14 the new Rule incorporates specific
guidelines. Sanctions "shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter,"
and when imposed, judges are to consider "directives of a
110. FED. R. CIV. P. I I advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
11. FED. R.CIV. P. 11(b).
112. FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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nonmonetary nature' 15 or "an order to pay a penalty into court
.... ,9116 Although the option to select an award of attorneys' fees
remains, it may only be employed "for effective deterrence" and any
award must be limited to the amount "incurred as a direct result of
the violation."'"17 The Committee Notes give further substance to the
provision by making it clear that this alternative should only be
employed in "unusual circumstances,"' 18 such as allegations made
for "any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."
'' 19
Strict restrictions are also imposed on the power of judges who
unilaterally initiate Rule 11 proceedings. First, the court must enter a
show cause order describing the specific conduct alleged to violate
the Rule.120 Second, the court must take that step before a voluntary
dismissal or settlement of the claim, or claims, in question.'
21
Finally, if a monetary sanction is imposed, it may only be paid "into
court" and not to opposing counsel.
122
Appellate courts are also requiring a higher standard of proof
when court-initiated sanctions are initiated. As recently explained by
the Second Circuit, "when a lawyer's submission, unchallenged by
an adversary, is subject to sanction by a court, the absence of a 'safe
harbor' opportunity to reconsider risks shift[s] the balance to the
detriment of the adversary process."'123 Coupling this fact with a
warning by the Advisory Committee that court-initiated sanction
proceedings should only be used in egregious situations, 24 risk to the
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (c)(2). Alternatives referred to in the Notes include
"striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure;
requiring participation in seminars or other educational programs;... [or]
referring the matter to disciplinary authorities." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee's note to 1993 amendment.
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (c)(2).
117. Id.
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
119. FED. R. CIV. P. ll(b)(1).
120. Id. l(c)(1)(B).
121. Id. ll(c)(2)(B).
122. Id. 1 1(c)(2). See also Vollmer v. Publishers Clearing House, 248 F.3d
698, 711 n.11 (7th Cir. 2001) (reversing $50,000 judge-initiated sanction
payable to charity; monetary sanctions awarded must be "paid only to the
court").
123. In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2003).
124. "Since show cause orders will ordinarily be issued only in situations
that are akin to a contempt of court, the [R]ule does not provide a 'safe harbor'
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"adversary process" was minimized by requiring that counsel's
action be in subjective bad faith. 125  Conceding that the use of an
objective standard "would deter some submissions deserving
condemnation," the court concluded in words equally applicable to
Judge Peck:
As for [the district judge's] appropriate concern for a
court's responsibility to "weed out abuses," we believe
... that his application of an "objectively unreasonable"
standard, in the absence of either an explicit "safe harbor"
protection or [similar protection], risks more damage to the
robust functioning of the adversary process than the benefit
it would achieve. 1
26
IV. 28 U.S.C. § 1927
The fact that the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 offer significant
protections to attorneys in the position of Professor Nakell, however,
does not end the matter. Rule 11 is but one of three primary sources
of authority that enable courts to sanction lawyers for improper
conduct. 127 Of the other two, inherent power 2 8 and 28 U.S.C. §
1927,129 it is the latter that currently raises a serious issue with
to a litigant for withdrawing a claim, defense, etc., after a show cause order has
been issued on the court's own initiative." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee's note to 1993 amendment.
125. Pennie, 323 F.3d at 91.
126. Id. at 93. See also Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler A.G., 331 F.3d 1251,
1255-56 (1 Ith Cir. 2003) (agreeing with Pennie but finding it unnecessary to
determine the mens rea issue); Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d
144, 153 (4th Cir. 2002) (sua sponte Rule 11 sanctions must be reviewed "with
particular stringency") (quoting United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. R & D Latex Corp.,
242 F.3d 1102,1115 (9th Cir. 2001)).
127. Omitted from coverage in the monograph are sanctions that may arise
for violation of the rules of discovery. For extensive analysis of this area, see
JOSEPH, supra note 11, at 529-626.
128. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980), the court
delivered the definitive summary of the bases on which a federal court may
levy sanctions under its inherent power, e.g., assessing attorneys' fees against
those "who willfully abuse judicial processes." Id. at 767. A specific finding
of bad faith must "precede any sanction under the court's inherent powers."
Id. at 766. For a comprehensive analysis of what constitutes "bad faith," see
JOSEPH, supra note 11, at 448-50.
129. In addition, Rule 38 authorizes fees against appellants whose appeals
reach the level of being labeled "frivolous." Laying aside tax protester cases,
counsel who proves to be totally inadequate (in briefing or arguing a case), or
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respect to its application and the robust functioning of the adversarial
process. This statute authorizes a court to enter an award of fees'
30
against any attorney who "multiplies [proceedings in a case]
unreasonably and vexatiously."'131 Unaccompanied by a definitional
one using the appellate process for an improper purpose, the Rule should not
be of concern. Referred to by Second Circuit Judge Miner as a provision
giving rise to an "occasional sanction," Roger J. Miner, Professional
Responsibility in Appellate Practice: A View From the Bench, 19 PACE L. REV.
323, 341 (1999), courts now take note of the fact that they "rarely find[] an
appeal to be frivolous," Stevenson v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 327 F.3d
400, 410 (5th Cir. 2003). Or, when imposing sanctions, courts point to the
"unique" nature of a lawyer's conduct. Tareco Prop., Inc. v. Morriss, 321 F.3d
545, 550 (6th Cir. 2003). The few journal articles on the subject speak in
terms of a downward trend and a "surprising reluctance" to impose Rule 38
sanctions. Mark R. Kravitz, Unpleasant Duties: Imposing Sanctions for
Frivolous Appeals, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PRoc. 335, 335 (2002). Others preface
their offerings with concessions such as "[a]dmittedly, it is rare that a court
will sanction an attorney for a frivolous appeal." Anastasia Parnham
Campbell, Frivolous Civil Appeals: How to Avoid Sanctions, 25 J. LEGAL
PROF. 135, 135-36 (2001); see also S. Jay Plager et al., The Federal Circuit &
Frivolous Appeals, 12 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 373, 391 (2003) (noting "dramatic
decline" in recent years of sanctions imposed under Rule 38). Added to this is
the complaint that when sanctions are imposed, they "fail adequately to
compensate," the appellee for having to defend an appeal found frivolous.
Kravitz, supra, at 335. Reality obviously plays a significant role with respect
to the Rule's limited use. The circuits are confronted with an ever increasing
caseload. See U.S. CTS. ANN. REP., Sept. 2002, at 39 tbl. S-3 (of 27,758 cases
terminated on the merits, only 32% involved oral argument and 80.5% were
handed down either in the form of affirmances without opinion or by
unpublished opinions). This fact, coupled with the 1994 amendment to the
Rule imposing a notice and opportunity to respond requirement is an obvious
disincentive to spending valuable judicial time making determinations as to
what are and are not "frivolous" appeals. Also lurking in the background is the
reality (as demonstrated by the pattern established under the 1983 version of
Rule 11) that any opinions indicating a willingness to entertain motions
seeking full or partial fee shifting guarantees a dramatic increase in collateral
litigation.
130. Restricted to that "reasonably incurred because of [the] conduct." 28
U.S.C. § 1927 (1994). See Peterson v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1396
(1 th Cir. 1997) (although conduct was unreasonable and vexatious, sanctions
denied because not connected to any multiplication of the proceedings).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Read literally, the statute cannot be used to attack a
complaint (as was the case with Professor Nakell). "[A]s a matter of law...
the filing of a single complaint cannot be held to have multiplied the
proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously .... ." DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d
499, 511-12 (4th Cir. 1999). See also In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., 78 F.3d 431,
436 (9th Cir. 1996) (Section 1927 does not apply to filing of complaint); In re
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component, it is obvious that with liability for fees at issue, 32 the
interpretation given the language is critically important.
133
The circuits are in conflict as to whether the term should be
construed to impose liability under an objective test or read to
incorporate a subjective bad faith requirement. 34 Compounding the
issue, is the fact that the circuits that employ an objective test are
unable to articulate a coherent, uniform approach.
3 1
Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1187 (9th Cir. 1986) ("It is only possible to multiply
or prolong proceedings after the complaint is filed."). The Seventh Circuit,
however, reaches the opposite conclusion that "Congress [in enacting § 1927]
rejected the theory that the common law litigant gets one free pleading." In re
TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 448 (7th Cir. 1985).
132. Awards in some cases can be quite substantial. Dube v. Eagle Global
Logistics, 314 F.3d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 2002) ($71,117.75); In re Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Action, 278 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir.
2002) ($50,000); Toon v. Wackenhut Con'. Corp., 250 F.3d 950, 952 (5th Cir.
2001) ($133,000); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No.
94-C897, 1999 WL 301653, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 1999) ($2.1 million);
Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 331 (2d Cir. 1999)
($400,000).
133. As analyzed by the Second Circuit:
We are cognizant of the unique dilemma that [§ 1927] sanctions
present. On the one hand, a court should discipline those who harass
their opponents and waste judicial resources by abusing the legal
process. On the other hand, in our adversarial system, we expect a
litigant and his or her attorney to pursue a claim zealously within the
boundaries of the law and ethical rules. Given these interests,
determining whether a case or conduct falls beyond the pale is perhaps
one of the most difficult and unenviable tasks for a court.
SchlaiferNance, 194 F.3d at 341.
134. In the District of Columbia Circuit, the standard remains unsettled. See
LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co. 146 F.3d 899, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1071 (1999).
135. The situation is exacerbated by conflicting opinions within the circuits.
In Peterson, 124 F.3d at 1395, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
"there is little case law in th[e] circuit concerning the standards applicable to
the award of sanctions under § 1927." The court read the statute to only
require a court to make its own determination as to what was "unreasonable
and vexatious" and "multiplies the proceedings." Id. at 1396. In Malautea v.
Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1544 (11 th Cir. 1993) (quoting Avirgan v.
Hill, 932 F.2d 1572, 1582 (1 1th Cir. 1991)), however, a panel concluded that
the statute only applied to those attorneys "who willfully abuse the judicial
process by conduct tantamount to bad faith." A recent opinion adopts the
higher objective standard. See Schwartz v. Millon Air, Inc., 341 F.3d 1220,
1225 (11 th Cir. 2003) (describing the statute in terms of "willful abuse" and
"conduct tantamount to bad faith"); see also Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 2003
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The First Circuit considers conduct that is "unreasonable and
harassing or annoying" and "more severe than mere negligence,
inadvertence, or incompetence" sanctionable.' 36 The Seventh Circuit
also excludes "ordinary negligence,"'137 and holds that sanctions may
be imposed "against an attorney where that attorney has acted in an
objectively unreasonable manner by engaging in a 'serious and
studied disregard for the orderly process of justice' . . . or where a
'claim [is] without a plausible legal or factual basis and lacking in
justification."' ' 138 In addition, that Circuit has been careful to point
out that the term "bad faith" has both subjective and objective
components:
"Bad faith" sounds like a subjective inquiry,... [but it]
has an objective meaning as well as a subjective one. A
lawyer has a duty... to limit litigation to contentions "well
grounded in fact and ... warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law." If a lawyer pursues a path that a
reasonably careful attorney would have known, after
appropriate inquiry, to be unsound, the conduct is
objectively unreasonable and vexatious. To put this a little
differently, a lawyer engages in bad faith by acting
recklessly or with indifference to the law, as well as by
acting in the teeth of what he knows to be the law .... A
lawyer's reckless indifference to the law may impose
substantial costs on the adverse party. Section 1927 permits
a court to insist that the attorney bear the costs of his own
lack of care.
139
WL 21499011, at *7 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2003) (interpreting circuit precedent
to require "merely that counsel's conduct sunk so far beneath a reasonable
standard of competence, much deeper than mere negligence, that it became
essentially indistinguishable from bad faith").
136. McLane, Graf, Raulerson & Middleton, P.A. v. Rechberger, 280 F.3d
26, 44 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d 626, 632 (1st Cir.
1990)).
137. Kotsilieris v. Chalmers, 966 F.2d 1181, 1184 (7th Cir. 1992).
138. Pac. Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Barosh, 22 F.3d 113, 119 (7th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Walter v. Fiorenzo, 840 F.2d 427, 433 (7th Cir. 1988)).
139. In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
For a detailed analysis of the rather confusing line of cases generated by the
Seventh Circuit see JOSEPH, supra note 11, at 397-98.
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In an en banc opinion,140 the Tenth Circuit employed the "acting
in the teeth" test as well as detailing a litany of proscribed conduct
including that which is "cavalier... or bent on misleading the court,
... reckless,. . . without a plausible basis... [or] flow[s] only from
an intentional departure from proper conduct, or, at a minimum, from
a reckless disregard of [his or her duty to the court].'
141
The Sixth Circuit also has a multitude of tests. Liability is
incurred in that circuit "when an attorney knows or reasonably
should know that a claim pursued is frivolous,"'142 or that his or her
trial tactics "will needlessly obstruct the litigation of non-frivolous
claims.' 4 3  Sanctions can also be imposed when "an attorney has
engaged in some sort of conduct that, from an objective standpoint,
'falls short of the obligations owed by the member of the bar to the
court and which, as a result, causes additional expense to the
opposing party." ' 144  This test, however, excludes "simple
inadvertence or negligence,"'145 rather:
There must be some conduct on the part of the subject
attorney that trial judges, applying the collective wisdom of
their experience on the bench, could agree falls short of the
obligations owed by a member of the bar to the court and
which, as a result, causes additional expense to the
opposing party.
14 6
Other circuits, while employing an objective test, have adopted a
much more rigorous standard. The Fifth Circuit requires "evidence
of bad faith, improper motive, or a reckless disregard of the duty
owed to the court.' 14 7 This includes "the persistent prosecution of a
140. Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
141. Id. at 1511-12. But cf, Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 208 F.3d 1180, 1187 n.9
(10th Cir. 2000) (equating § 1927 with the court's inherent power).
142. Tareco Prop., Inc. v. Morriss, 321 F.3d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Jones v. Cont'l Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1230 (6th Cir. 1986)).
143. Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 969 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Jones, 789 F.2d at 1230).
144. Id. (citing Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1049 (6th Cir.
1996) (quoting In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir. 1987)).
145. Ruben, 825 F.2d at 984.
146. Id.
147. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519, 525 (5th Cir.
2002) (quoting Edwards v. Gen. Motors Corp., 153 F.3d 242, 246 (5th Cir.
1998)). See also Conner v. Travis County, 209 F.3d 794, 799 (5th Cir. 2000)
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meritless claim,"'148 but excludes representation by counsel that is
determined to have been performed "with vigor."149 Similarly, the
Eighth Circuit asks whether the conduct "viewed objectively,
manifests either intentional or reckless disregard of the attorney's
duties to the court."' 50 Adding further substance, the Ninth Circuit,
after making it clear that "recklessness suffices for § 1927, but bad
faith is required for [inherent power] sanctions,"' sets specific
criteria for behavior that is sanctionable. Specifically, "[f]or
sanctions to apply, if a filing is submitted recklessly, it must be
frivolous, while if it is not frivolous, it must be intended to
harass.... [R]eckless nonfrivolous filings, without more, may not
be sanctioned.'
152
In contrast to the hodgepodge of tests employed by circuits
using an objective test, those holding that the statute requires a
finding of subjective bad faith approach the issue with some degree
of uniformity. All agree that the standard for liability is strict and
accords with that used when a court employs its inherent power.
53
(distinguishing § 1927 test from that employed under the court's inherent
power).
148. Browning v. Kramer, 931 F.2d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 1991).
149. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 960 F.2d 439, 448 (5th Cir.
1992). As with the Eleventh Circuit, supra note 130, panels within the Circuit
will take a conflicting approach. For instance, in Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v.
American Airlines, Inc., 283 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2002), counsel did not appear
with a certain witness at a hearing and the court imposed $18,404 in sanctions.
Judge Jones, writing for the Court affirmed, concluding: "All that is required to
support § 1927 sanctions is a determination, supported by the record, that an
attorney multiplied proceedings in a case in an unreasonable manner." Id. at
291.
150. Lee v. First Lenders Ins. Serv., Inc., 236 F.3d 443, 445 (8th Cir. 2001)
(citing Lee v. L.B. Sales, Inc., 177 F.3d 714, 718 (8th Cir. 1999)).
151. B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1107 (9th Cir. 2002).
152. Id. (alterations in original).
153. Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 336 (2d Cir.
1999) ("[T]he only meaningful difference between an award made under §
1927 and one made pursuant to the court's inherent power is... that awards
under § 1927 are made only against attorneys or other persons authorized to
practice before the courts while an award made under the court's inherent
power may be made against an attorney, a party, or both."); see also In re
Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Actions, 278 F.3d 175, 181 (3d
Cir. 2002) (equating § 1927 with inherent power); Brubaker v. City of
Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1382 n.25 (4th Cir. 1991) (equating § 1927 with
inherent power).
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As explained by the Second Circuit, a claim must have no "colorable
basis" and be "motivated by improper purposes such as harassment
or delay."''T However, "bad faith, may be inferred 'only if actions
are so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that they
must have been undertaken for some improper purpose ....*,155
The Third and Fourth Circuits require a finding of "willful bad
faith on the part of the offending attorney" before § 1927 sanctions
may be imposed.156 As with the Second Circuit, "indications of bad
faith [include] findings that the claims advanced were meritless, that
counsel knew or should have known [that they were without merit],
and that the motive for filing the suit was for an improper purpose
such as harassment."'
5 7
In 1986, as today, the circuits were in conflict with respect to the
correct standard for § 1927 liability. In that year, the Court
dismissed a grant of certiorari in a case in which the Sixth Circuit
held that § 1927 "does not require a finding of recklessness,
subjective bad faith, or conscious impropriety; ... [liability only
requires] pursuing claims that [an attorney] should know are
frivolous."' 58 Assuming a decision by the Court to revisit the issue,
it is suggested that adherence to a clear legislative history would
require a much higher threshold of liability than that envisioned by
the Sixth Circuit.
V. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 1927
Section 1927 originally 5 9 provided that only "excess costs"
could be assessed against attorneys who multiplied litigation in a
manner which could be characterized as "unreasonabl[e] and
vexatious."'16 In 1979, two independent works were completed that
were to have a direct bearing on the statute. Judge Renfrew of the
154. SchlafferNance, 194 F.3d at 336.
155. Salovaara v. Eckert, 222 F.3d 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Shafii v.
British Airways, PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1996)).
156. Prudential, 278 F.3d at 188; Brubaker, 943 F.2d at 1382 (equating bad
faith under the court's inherent power to requirements for § 1927).
157. Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers, 829 F.2d 1370, 1375 (6th Cir.
1987).
158. Haynie v. Ross Gear Div. of TRW, Inc., 799 F.2d 237, 243 (6th Cir.
1986), cert. dismissed, 482 U.S. 901 (1987).
159. The statute was enacted in 1813. Ch. 14 § 3, 3 Stat. 21 (1813).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1970).
Winter 2004)
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:691
Northern District of California wrote a provocative article 61 calling
for procedural reforms he believed necessary to interdict the dilatory
behavior so predominant in antitrust cases and other areas of
complex federal litigation. Focusing on § 1927, he suggested
reconsideration of precedent giving a limited construction to the
statute'62 and an amendment to authorize an award of attorneys'
fees.' 63 Finally, he advocated giving notice to an offending attorney
and "an opportunity to present evidence and arguments concerning
the propriety" of sanctions.1 64
The National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and
Procedures also issued a report 65 which made suggestions similar to
those of Judge Renfrew. Focusing on the increase of "dilatory and
abusive litigation" tactics in the antitrust area,166 it called for the
amendment of § 1927 "to incorporate a more realistic 'state of mind'
requirement, and.., to allow recovery of a fuller range of expenses,
including attorneys' fees.' 67 As a result of the report, what was to
become the Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980168 was
introduced in Congress as Senate Bill 390. One provision substituted
1927's language in favor of an assessment of costs, expenses and
161. Charles B. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67
CAL. L. REv. 264 (1979). Compare H.R. Doc. No. 25, 27th Cong., 3d Sess.
21 (1842) ("The statute [intended] to restrain the increase of costs
unreasonably and vexatiously, has been disregarded in practice; or it is
defective in its provisions, if insufficient to prevent the abuses and mischiefs
which have occurred, and which it ought to prevent, if it [does] not."), with
David W. Pollak, Comment, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who
Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 619, 623-29, 640 (1977)
(noting the statute's disuse and arguing for more frequent application); David
N. Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motion Practice: Time for Change, 44
FORDHAM L. REv. 1069, 1078 (1976) (calling for a change of § 1927).
162. Renfrew, supra note 161, at 270.
163. Id. at269-70.
164. Id. at 281. See also M. Scott Cooper, Comment, Financial Penalties
Imposed Directly Against Attorneys in Litigation Without Resort to the
Contempt Power, 26 UCLA L. REv. 855, 857-58, 883 (1979) (arguing that
minimal due process requires notice and hearing prior to the imposition of
sanctions.).
165. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE REvIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND
PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND ATTORNEY GENERAL 81 (1979)
[hereinafter NAT'L COMM'N REPORT].
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Pub. L. No. 96-349, 94 Stat. 1156 (1980).
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"attorney's fees" against counsel "who engages in conduct
unreasonably and primarily for the purpose of delaying or increasing
the cost of the litigation .... 11169
Witnesses in support of the bill included Judge Renfrew and
John Shenefield, Chairman of the National Commission. Each
supported increased sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees.170 In
addition, they agreed that the newly proposed language was
sufficient to override "restrictive interpretations"17' which had
previously resulted in underutilization of § 1927. A report by the
Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association, however,
strongly opposed the change. Arguing that "a chilling effect on
counsel becomes real when it is realized that a decision on whether
or not delay is unnecessary and dilatory will often depend upon the
subjective attitude" of a judge, 7 2 it recommended the addition of
certain safeguard:
[T]o minimize the chilling effect which will result from use
of the personal sanctions. The safeguards are based on a
presumption that all counsel are competent, diligent, and
ethical.... Consequently, there should be a very substantial
burden on anyone who contends that counsel is acting
otherwise. Accordingly, it is believed that there should be
three requisites for the imposition of sanctions or penalties:
(1) a heavy burden of proving improper motive,
(2) at least one warning by the judge with respect to the
possible continuation of conduct which is deemed
reprehensible, and
(3) delays in the imposition of personal penalties upon the
lawyer until the end of the case. 
173
169. Antitrust Procedural Improvement Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 390
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly & Business Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1979) [hereinafter
Hearings on S. 390]. But see NAT'L COMM'N REPORT, supra note 165, at 94
n. 13 (recommending language found in S. 390).
170. See Hearings on S. 390, supra note 169, at 8, 27-29.
171. Id. at8,27.
172. Id. at 230.
173. Id. at 233; see id. at 60 (testimony by David Foster concluding that the
new language was "subjective in the extreme"). It is also interesting to note
that there was only one isolated reference to the fact that the new amendment
would apply to all litigation, not just that brought pursuant to the antitrust laws.
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Subsequently, the Senate Judiciary Committee made significant
amendments. They included: (1) inserting "intentionally" as the
descriptive word for conduct proscribed, that is, "unreasonably and
primarily for the purpose of delay.... ."; (2) adding a new subsection
requiring hearings on motions for sanctions; and (3) prohibiting
imposition of sanctions unless an attorney has "been previously
warned by the court that continuation of such conduct would result in
the imposition of... costs, expenses and attorney's fees. 174
On the House side, amendments to § 1927 were introduced as
House Bill 4047, a bill identical to the original Senate Bill 390.175
John Shenefield again testified that "this statute [§ 1927] has been
underutilized and has received varying restrictive interpretations in
the courts.' 76 If accepted, he believed that House Bill 4047 "would
provide a meaningful disincentive to unreasonable delay .... ,,177 He
opposed Senate amendments, particularly the "requirement that an
attorney be warned not to continue what has already been found to be
unreasonable dilatory conduct, [which] might undermine the
effectiveness' 78 of the statute.
See id. at 50 (testimony of Peter M. Gerhart noting that since "section 1927
applies to all Federal litigation, it might be desirable" to place it in a category
other than antitrust improvements).
174. In its entirety, proposed § 1927 read as follows:
(a) Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States or any territory thereof who intentionally
engages in conduct unreasonably and primarily for the purpose of
delaying or increasing the cost of the litigation may be required by the
court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses and attorneys'
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
(b) Costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees shall be imposed under this
section upon motion of any party only after a hearing, held after trial.
(c) No such costs, expenses, and attorneys fees shall be imposed
unless the attorney continues to engage in conduct which is deemed to
violate this section after having been previously warned by the court
that continuation of such conduct would result in the imposition of
such costs, expenses, and attorneys fees.
Id. at 137-38.
175. Antitrust Procedural Improvements and Jurisdictional Amendments:
Hearings on H.R. 4047 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979)
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 4047].
176. Id. at23.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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Judge Renfrew also supported House Bill 4047 and opposed
Senate amendments. He believed that a specific intent standard was
unnecessary since it "would not alter to any great extent the
requirement... that an attorney's conduct must have been
undertaken solely for delay to be sanctionable."' 17 9 Arguments in
opposition pointed to the "vagueness" of the proposed amendment
and the fact that existing law "provide[d] for realistic boundaries of
liability ....",o
After the House and Senate failed to agree, Senate Bill 390 was
sent to conference. At that point, a consensus was reached to retain
the original wording of the section ("multiplies... unreasonably and
vexatiously") and to expand the statute to include liability for
attorneys' fees.18' The Conference Report also made it clear that the
"existing standard" for dilatory behavior was the criterion for
interpreting the statute.
8 2
On the floor of the House, Congressman Mazzoli emphasized
what he believed to be the understandings reached by the Senate and
House conferees:
The managers on the part of the House were firm in their
resolve to maintain the tough standard of current law so that
the legislation in no way would dampen the legitimate zeal
of an attorney in representing a client.
Under the agreement of managers, an attorney may be
required to pay costs, as well as expenses and attorneys'
fees reasonably incurred on account of such attorney's
dilatory conduct. But, the standard is that in current law,
not the less-severe standard the Senate had agreed to
originally.
183
Although neither the Conference Report or the House debate are
accompanied by case authority, this "tough standard of [the] current
179. Id. at 61.
180. Id. at 87 (testimony of Howard A. Vine). Peter M. Gerhart, who
undertook an empirical study for the National Commission for the Review of
Antitrust Laws and Procedures, also pointed out that "care must be taken to
insure that the standard for imposing sanctions is not so liberalized as to chill
the vigorous litigation of legitimate claims and defenses." Id. at 152.
181. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 96-1234, at 8 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2781.
182. Id.
183. 126 CONG. REc. 23625-26 (1980).
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law" is found in Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc.,184 a case cited
by all witnesses arguing for a change in the then current "restrictive"
standard of § 1927.185
In Kiefel, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a decision by a trial court
to impose § 1927 sanctions on an attorney who had engaged in
intentional acts of misconduct that involved "serious breaches of the
Canons of Ethics."'1 86 Viewing the language of § 1927 as imposing a
"restrictive standard," the court affirmed the imposition of
sanctions. 187 In doing so, it interpreted § 1927 liability to hinge on
the issue of whether the conduct in question reflected a "serious and
studied disregard for the orderly processes of justice."
l8 8
Greg Joseph is the author of the major treatise providing an in-
depth analysis of cases involving § 1927.189 After his own
exhaustive review of how circuits are managing (or mismanaging)
the "unreasonably and vexatiously" issue, 190 he recommends that it
should be interpreted to describe:
[C]onduct that, objectively viewed, evinces the intentional
or reckless pursuit of a claim, defense or position (1) that is,
or should be, known by the lawyer to be unwarranted in fact
or law, or (2) that is advanced for the primary purpose of
obstructing the orderly progress of a litigation.
91
This restrictive definition, similar to that recently adopted by the
Ninth Circuit,' 92 is clearly compatible with arguments Congress
found persuasive in 1980: that § 1927 not be amended in a way that
would chill advocacy or stray from the "substantial burden"
considered explicit in the Kiefel "serious and studied disregard for
the orderly processes of justice" test.193 It should be adopted.
184. 404 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969).
185. Hearings on S. 390, supra note 169, at 8, 27; Hearings on H.R. 4047,
supra note 175, at 23, 60, 152.
186. Kiefel, 404 F.2d at 1167.
187. See id.
188. Id.
189. See JOSEPH, supra note 11.
190. Id. at 395-401.
191. Id. at400-01.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
193. Kiefel, 404 F.2d at 1167.
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VI. CONCLUSION
My position with respect to the 1993 amendment was finalized
when, three years after it was put in place, I advised the Center for
Constitutional Rights that there was no longer any need for the Rule
11 Project. Nothing in the interim has occurred to alter my
conclusion that the revision reflects work done with surgical
precision. Without question, it is now obvious the new Rule has
drastically curtailed satellite litigation and minimized risks to the
adversary process without reducing the role of the Rule in insuring a
certain level of professional competence by members of the bar.
With respect to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, all circuits agree that the
statute should only be employed in situations in which there is
intentional lawyer conduct far in excess of that which can be labeled
negligent. Moreover, even though some fail to fully implement a
congressional desire to limit the statute's application to situations
reflecting a "serious and studied disregard" of the judicial process,
there is nothing in the reported cases of real or perceived abuses that
raise issues similar to those arising from the 1983 version of Rule
11.194
Finally, although the 1993 amendment to Rule 11 produced a
much calmer environment in the legal community with respect to the
role of sanctions, it is still in many ways a "capricious business." 195
As pointed out by Professor Vairo, given the wrong lawyer before
the wrong judge with the wrong case, a decision to award sanctions
will be made by a judge "advocating the correctness of his
decision... [and who] has the power to make an attorney's
argument seem frivolous."'196 Human factors such as personality and
bias insure that there will always be conflict between some members
of the bar and some judges. Thus, no matter how carefully crafted
the restrictions, there will never be a "last man [or woman]" attorney
subjected to what any objective observer would conclude is the
194. See JOSEPH, supra note 11, at 373-426.
195. Weinstein v. Univ. of II1., 811 F.2d 1091, 1099 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196. Georgene Vairo, Analysis ofAugust 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, in 1 CIVIL PRACTICE & LITIGATION IN FEDERAL &
STATE COURTS 77-78 (1985).
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arbitrary imposition of sanctions.197 This does not detract from the
conclusion, however, that because of the 1993 amendments to Rule
11, lawyers litigate today in an environment far removed from that in
place under the 1983 version.
197. Monroe H. Freedman, The Need for a Rule I Ifor Judges, 128 F.R.D.
437, 439 (1989).
